<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/"><channel><title>ACLs | A DevOps Blog</title><link>https://blog.bsdserver.nl/tag/acl/</link><description>Hands-on DevOps and homelab content: Kubernetes clusters, self-hosted services, CI/CD pipelines and infrastructure as code, by Patrick de Ruiter of We Build Your Cloud.</description><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 09:00:00 +0100</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://blog.bsdserver.nl/tag/acl/rss/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><ttl>60</ttl><item><title>BIND Zone Security: Views, ACLs, and Query Restrictions</title><link>https://blog.bsdserver.nl/bind-zone-security-views-acls-and-query-restrictions/</link><guid isPermaLink="false">693b6bf979eb54000160a55c</guid><dc:creator>Patrick de Ruiter</dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 12 Dec 2025 01:12:25 +0000</pubDate><description>A properly secured DNS server is critical infrastructure.</description><category>BIND</category><category>DNS</category><category>Security</category><category>ACLs</category><category>Linux</category><media:content url="https://blog.bsdserver.nl/content/images/2026/01/bind-zone-security.png" medium="image"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A properly secured DNS server is critical infrastructure. An open resolver can be abused for DNS amplification attacks, leak internal network information, or serve as a reconnaissance tool for attackers.</p>
<p>This guide covers BIND&rsquo;s security features: Access Control Lists (ACLs), query and transfer restrictions, views for split-horizon DNS, rate limiting and security logging. It ends with one complete configuration that combines them.</p>
<h2 id="understanding-the-threat-model">Understanding the Threat Model <a class="anchor" data-pagefind-ignore href="#understanding-the-threat-model" aria-label="Link to this section">#</a></h2>
<p>Each threat has a matching BIND feature:</p>
<table>
	<thead>
			<tr>
					<th>Threat</th>
					<th>What happens</th>
					<th>Defence in this post</th>
			</tr>
	</thead>
	<tbody>
			<tr>
					<td>Open resolver abuse</td>
					<td>Attackers use your server to amplify DDoS attacks</td>
					<td><code>allow-recursion</code>, rate limiting</td>
			</tr>
			<tr>
					<td>Information disclosure</td>
					<td>Internal hostnames and IPs leak to the internet</td>
					<td>Views, per-zone <code>allow-query</code></td>
			</tr>
			<tr>
					<td>Cache poisoning</td>
					<td>Malicious records injected into resolver caches</td>
					<td>Restricted recursion, DNSSEC validation</td>
			</tr>
			<tr>
					<td>Zone transfer exposure</td>
					<td>Unauthorized parties download your entire zone</td>
					<td><code>allow-transfer</code>, TSIG</td>
			</tr>
			<tr>
					<td>Resource exhaustion</td>
					<td>Query floods consume server resources</td>
					<td>Rate limiting, minimal responses</td>
			</tr>
	</tbody>
</table>
<h3 id="when-to-use-what">When to use what <a class="anchor" data-pagefind-ignore href="#when-to-use-what" aria-label="Link to this section">#</a></h3>
<ul>
<li><strong>Every server</strong>: ACLs, restricted transfers, hidden version, rate limiting.</li>
<li><strong>Resolvers</strong>: restrict recursion and cache access to your own networks.</li>
<li><strong>Views</strong>: only when internal and external clients must get different answers for the same zone.</li>
</ul>
<h2 id="access-control-lists-acls">Access Control Lists (ACLs) <a class="anchor" data-pagefind-ignore href="#access-control-lists-acls" aria-label="Link to this section">#</a></h2>
<p>ACLs define groups of IP addresses that can be referenced throughout your configuration. Define them once, use them everywhere: changing a network then means editing one list.</p>
<h3 id="basic-acl-syntax">Basic ACL Syntax <a class="anchor" data-pagefind-ignore href="#basic-acl-syntax" aria-label="Link to this section">#</a></h3>
<p>Name each ACL after the role of the clients, so the options that use it read clearly (<code>allow-transfer { secondary-servers; }</code>).</p>
<pre tabindex="0"><code>acl &#34;trusted&#34; {
    localhost;
    localnets;
    192.168.0.0/16;
    10.0.0.0/8;
};

acl &#34;internal-networks&#34; {
    192.168.1.0/24;
    192.168.2.0/24;
    172.16.0.0/12;
};

acl &#34;secondary-servers&#34; {
    192.168.1.10;
    192.168.1.11;
};
</code></pre><h3 id="built-in-acl-keywords">Built-in ACL Keywords <a class="anchor" data-pagefind-ignore href="#built-in-acl-keywords" aria-label="Link to this section">#</a></h3>
<p>BIND provides several predefined ACLs:</p>
<table>
	<thead>
			<tr>
					<th>Keyword</th>
					<th>Matches</th>
			</tr>
	</thead>
	<tbody>
			<tr>
					<td><code>any</code></td>
					<td>All hosts</td>
			</tr>
			<tr>
					<td><code>none</code></td>
					<td>No hosts</td>
			</tr>
			<tr>
					<td><code>localhost</code></td>
					<td>IP addresses of all local interfaces</td>
			</tr>
			<tr>
					<td><code>localnets</code></td>
					<td>Networks directly connected to local interfaces</td>
			</tr>
	</tbody>
</table>
<h3 id="negation-in-acls">Negation in ACLs <a class="anchor" data-pagefind-ignore href="#negation-in-acls" aria-label="Link to this section">#</a></h3>
<p>Use <code>!</code> to exclude addresses. This ACL matches everyone outside the private ranges:</p>
<pre tabindex="0"><code>acl &#34;external-only&#34; {
    !10.0.0.0/8;
    !172.16.0.0/12;
    !192.168.0.0/16;
    any;
};
</code></pre><p>Order matters: BIND evaluates rules top to bottom and uses the first match. Put the exclusions before <code>any</code>, or they never apply.</p>
<h2 id="query-restrictions">Query Restrictions <a class="anchor" data-pagefind-ignore href="#query-restrictions" aria-label="Link to this section">#</a></h2>
<p>Three options control who may do what:</p>
<table>
	<thead>
			<tr>
					<th>Option</th>
					<th>Controls</th>
					<th>Typical value</th>
			</tr>
	</thead>
	<tbody>
			<tr>
					<td><code>allow-recursion</code></td>
					<td>Who may make the server look up names elsewhere</td>
					<td>Your own networks</td>
			</tr>
			<tr>
					<td><code>allow-query</code></td>
					<td>Who may query at all</td>
					<td><code>any</code> on authoritative servers, your networks on resolvers</td>
			</tr>
			<tr>
					<td><code>allow-query-cache</code></td>
					<td>Who may get answers from the cache</td>
					<td>Same as <code>allow-recursion</code></td>
			</tr>
	</tbody>
</table>
<h3 id="restricting-recursion">Restricting Recursion <a class="anchor" data-pagefind-ignore href="#restricting-recursion" aria-label="Link to this section">#</a></h3>
<p>The most critical security setting. Never allow recursion for the entire internet:</p>
<pre tabindex="0"><code>options {
    directory &#34;/var/named&#34;;
    
    // Only allow recursion for trusted networks
    recursion yes;
    allow-recursion { trusted; };
    
    // Alternatively, disable recursion entirely for authoritative-only servers
    // recursion no;
};
</code></pre><h3 id="restricting-queries">Restricting Queries <a class="anchor" data-pagefind-ignore href="#restricting-queries" aria-label="Link to this section">#</a></h3>
<p>Limit who can query your server. An authoritative server must answer anyone; an internal resolver only its own clients. The cache is restricted separately, so outsiders cannot read what your users looked up.</p>
<pre tabindex="0"><code>options {
    // Global query restriction
    allow-query { any; };  // For authoritative servers
    // allow-query { trusted; };  // For internal resolvers
    
    // Restrict cache access
    allow-query-cache { trusted; };
};
</code></pre><h3 id="per-zone-query-restrictions">Per-Zone Query Restrictions <a class="anchor" data-pagefind-ignore href="#per-zone-query-restrictions" aria-label="Link to this section">#</a></h3>
<p>A zone-level <code>allow-query</code> overrides the global one. Here the public zone answers anyone, the internal zone only the internal networks:</p>
<pre tabindex="0"><code>zone &#34;public.example.com&#34; {
    type primary;
    file &#34;zones/public.example.com.zone&#34;;
    allow-query { any; };
};

zone &#34;internal.example.com&#34; {
    type primary;
    file &#34;zones/internal.example.com.zone&#34;;
    allow-query { internal-networks; };
};
</code></pre><h2 id="zone-transfer-security">Zone Transfer Security <a class="anchor" data-pagefind-ignore href="#zone-transfer-security" aria-label="Link to this section">#</a></h2>
<p>A zone transfer (AXFR) hands over every record in the zone at once. Only your slaves need it.</p>
<h3 id="restricting-zone-transfers">Restricting Zone Transfers <a class="anchor" data-pagefind-ignore href="#restricting-zone-transfers" aria-label="Link to this section">#</a></h3>
<p>Deny transfers globally, then allow them per zone for the slaves only. <code>also-notify</code> tells the slaves about changes straight away.</p>
<pre tabindex="0"><code>options {
    // Disable by default
    allow-transfer { none; };
};

zone &#34;example.com&#34; {
    type primary;
    file &#34;zones/example.com.zone&#34;;
    // Only allow transfers to secondary servers
    allow-transfer { secondary-servers; };
    also-notify { 192.168.1.10; 192.168.1.11; };
};
</code></pre><h3 id="tsig-authenticated-transfers">TSIG-Authenticated Transfers <a class="anchor" data-pagefind-ignore href="#tsig-authenticated-transfers" aria-label="Link to this section">#</a></h3>
<p>IP addresses can be spoofed; a TSIG key cannot be guessed. For maximum security, require a signed request. The <a href="https://blog.bsdserver.nl/how-to-configure-bind-rndc-and-tsig-keys-for-remote-dns-management/">rndc and TSIG post</a> shows how to generate the key and configure the slave.</p>
<pre tabindex="0"><code>key &#34;transfer-key&#34; {
    algorithm hmac-sha256;
    secret &#34;base64-encoded-secret&#34;;
};

zone &#34;example.com&#34; {
    type primary;
    file &#34;zones/example.com.zone&#34;;
    allow-transfer { key &#34;transfer-key&#34;; };
};
</code></pre><h2 id="views-for-split-horizon-dns">Views for Split-Horizon DNS <a class="anchor" data-pagefind-ignore href="#views-for-split-horizon-dns" aria-label="Link to this section">#</a></h2>
<p>Views allow the same zone to return different answers based on client IP address. This is essential for split-horizon DNS where internal and external clients need different responses.</p>
<h3 id="when-to-use-views">When to use views <a class="anchor" data-pagefind-ignore href="#when-to-use-views" aria-label="Link to this section">#</a></h3>
<ul>
<li><strong>Use them</strong> when one name must resolve to an internal IP inside and a public IP outside, or when internal-only records must stay invisible from outside.</li>
<li><strong>Skip them</strong> if you can use separate zone names (such as <code>internal.example.com</code>) with a per-zone <code>allow-query</code>; that is simpler.</li>
</ul>
<h3 id="basic-view-configuration">Basic View Configuration <a class="anchor" data-pagefind-ignore href="#basic-view-configuration" aria-label="Link to this section">#</a></h3>
<p>Each view picks its clients with <code>match-clients</code> and has its own copy of the zone, with its own file.</p>
<table>
	<thead>
			<tr>
					<th>View</th>
					<th>Clients</th>
					<th>Recursion</th>
					<th>Zone file</th>
			</tr>
	</thead>
	<tbody>
			<tr>
					<td><code>internal</code></td>
					<td>Private ranges and localhost</td>
					<td>Yes</td>
					<td><code>zones/internal/example.com.zone</code></td>
			</tr>
			<tr>
					<td><code>external</code></td>
					<td>Everyone else</td>
					<td>No</td>
					<td><code>zones/external/example.com.zone</code></td>
			</tr>
	</tbody>
</table>
<p>Once you use views, every zone must be inside a view. That is why the root hint zone (<code>zone &quot;.&quot;</code>) sits in the internal view: recursion needs it.</p>
<pre tabindex="0"><code>acl &#34;internal&#34; {
    192.168.0.0/16;
    10.0.0.0/8;
    172.16.0.0/12;
    localhost;
};

acl &#34;external&#34; {
    !192.168.0.0/16;
    !10.0.0.0/8;
    !172.16.0.0/12;
    any;
};

view &#34;internal&#34; {
    match-clients { internal; };
    
    // Internal clients get recursion
    recursion yes;
    
    zone &#34;example.com&#34; {
        type primary;
        file &#34;zones/internal/example.com.zone&#34;;
    };
    
    zone &#34;.&#34; {
        type hint;
        file &#34;named.ca&#34;;
    };
};

view &#34;external&#34; {
    match-clients { external; };
    
    // No recursion for external clients
    recursion no;
    
    zone &#34;example.com&#34; {
        type primary;
        file &#34;zones/external/example.com.zone&#34;;
    };
};
</code></pre><h3 id="internal-zone-file">Internal Zone File <a class="anchor" data-pagefind-ignore href="#internal-zone-file" aria-label="Link to this section">#</a></h3>
<p>The internal version includes the private addresses and internal-only hosts like <code>db</code> and <code>ldap</code>.</p>
<pre tabindex="0"><code>; zones/internal/example.com.zone
$TTL 86400
@   IN  SOA ns1.example.com. admin.example.com. (
        2024010101  ; Serial
        3600        ; Refresh
        1800        ; Retry
        604800      ; Expire
        86400 )     ; Minimum TTL

    IN  NS  ns1.example.com.
    IN  NS  ns2.example.com.
    IN  A   192.168.1.100      ; Internal IP

ns1     IN  A   192.168.1.10
ns2     IN  A   192.168.1.11
www     IN  A   192.168.1.100  ; Internal web server
mail    IN  A   192.168.1.50   ; Internal mail server
db      IN  A   192.168.1.200  ; Database - internal only
ldap    IN  A   192.168.1.201  ; LDAP - internal only
</code></pre><h3 id="external-zone-file">External Zone File <a class="anchor" data-pagefind-ignore href="#external-zone-file" aria-label="Link to this section">#</a></h3>
<p>The external version has the public addresses and leaves out internal hosts entirely.</p>
<pre tabindex="0"><code>; zones/external/example.com.zone
$TTL 86400
@   IN  SOA ns1.example.com. admin.example.com. (
        2024010101  ; Serial
        3600        ; Refresh
        1800        ; Retry
        604800      ; Expire
        86400 )     ; Minimum TTL

    IN  NS  ns1.example.com.
    IN  NS  ns2.example.com.
    IN  A   203.0.113.100      ; Public IP
    IN  MX  10 mail.example.com.

ns1     IN  A   203.0.113.10
ns2     IN  A   203.0.113.11
www     IN  A   203.0.113.100  ; Public web server
mail    IN  A   203.0.113.50   ; Public mail server
; No db or ldap records - not accessible externally
</code></pre><h3 id="view-ordering">View Ordering <a class="anchor" data-pagefind-ignore href="#view-ordering" aria-label="Link to this section">#</a></h3>
<p>Views are evaluated in order and a client gets the first view that matches. Place more specific views first and end with a catch-all:</p>
<pre tabindex="0"><code>view &#34;admin&#34; {
    match-clients { 192.168.1.5; };  // Admin workstation
    // Full access, debugging enabled
};

view &#34;internal&#34; {
    match-clients { internal; };
    // Standard internal access
};

view &#34;external&#34; {
    match-clients { any; };  // Catch-all
    // Restricted external access
};
</code></pre><h2 id="rate-limiting">Rate Limiting <a class="anchor" data-pagefind-ignore href="#rate-limiting" aria-label="Link to this section">#</a></h2>
<p>Response Rate Limiting (RRL) protects against DNS amplification and query floods. It counts responses per client network and drops the excess.</p>
<pre tabindex="0"><code>options {
    rate-limit {
        responses-per-second 10;
        referrals-per-second 5;
        nodata-per-second 5;
        nxdomains-per-second 5;
        errors-per-second 5;
        all-per-second 20;
        window 15;
        slip 2;
        ipv4-prefix-length 24;
        ipv6-prefix-length 56;
    };
};
</code></pre><p>Key parameters:</p>
<ul>
<li><code>responses-per-second</code>: limit identical responses.</li>
<li><code>referrals-</code>, <code>nodata-</code>, <code>nxdomains-</code>, <code>errors-per-second</code>: separate limits per response type.</li>
<li><code>all-per-second</code>: limit on all responses to one client network.</li>
<li><code>slip</code>: send truncated responses (forcing TCP) instead of dropping. A real client retries over TCP; a spoofed victim gets nothing large.</li>
<li><code>window</code>: time window for rate calculation.</li>
<li><code>ipv4-prefix-length</code> / <code>ipv6-prefix-length</code>: group clients by /24 (IPv4) or /56 (IPv6) instead of individual IPs.</li>
</ul>
<h2 id="response-policy">Response Policy <a class="anchor" data-pagefind-ignore href="#response-policy" aria-label="Link to this section">#</a></h2>
<h3 id="minimal-responses">Minimal Responses <a class="anchor" data-pagefind-ignore href="#minimal-responses" aria-label="Link to this section">#</a></h3>
<p>Smaller answers make the server less useful as an amplifier:</p>
<ul>
<li><code>minimal-responses yes</code>: leave out optional authority and additional records.</li>
<li><code>minimal-any yes</code>: answer an ANY query with one record set instead of everything for the name.</li>
</ul>
<pre tabindex="0"><code>options {
    minimal-responses yes;
    minimal-any yes;
};
</code></pre><h3 id="disable-any-queries">Disable ANY Queries <a class="anchor" data-pagefind-ignore href="#disable-any-queries" aria-label="Link to this section">#</a></h3>
<p>ANY queries are often used in amplification attacks, because one small query can return every record for a name:</p>
<pre tabindex="0"><code>options {
    minimal-any yes;  // Return minimal response
    // Or block entirely with RPZ
};
</code></pre><h2 id="logging-security-events">Logging Security Events <a class="anchor" data-pagefind-ignore href="#logging-security-events" aria-label="Link to this section">#</a></h2>
<p>Security events and zone transfers go to one file, queries to their own (they grow fast):</p>
<ul>
<li><code>category security</code>: denied queries, transfers and updates.</li>
<li><code>xfer-in</code>, <code>xfer-out</code>, <code>notify</code>: every zone transfer and notify, so you can spot unexpected AXFR attempts.</li>
<li><code>category queries</code>: every query, once query logging is on (<code>rndc querylog</code>).</li>
</ul>
<pre tabindex="0"><code>logging {
    channel security_log {
        file &#34;/var/log/named/security.log&#34; versions 5 size 10m;
        severity info;
        print-time yes;
        print-severity yes;
        print-category yes;
    };
    
    channel query_log {
        file &#34;/var/log/named/queries.log&#34; versions 5 size 50m;
        severity info;
        print-time yes;
    };
    
    category security { security_log; };
    category queries { query_log; };
    category xfer-in { security_log; };
    category xfer-out { security_log; };
    category notify { security_log; };
};
</code></pre><h2 id="complete-secure-configuration-example">Complete Secure Configuration Example <a class="anchor" data-pagefind-ignore href="#complete-secure-configuration-example" aria-label="Link to this section">#</a></h2>
<p>This configuration combines all features above: a split-horizon server that resolves for trusted clients and is authoritative-only for everyone else.</p>
<ul>
<li>Global defaults deny everything risky: recursion, transfers, updates.</li>
<li><code>version</code>, <code>hostname</code>, <code>server-id</code> <code>&quot;not disclosed&quot;</code>: hide the answers to <code>version.bind</code>, <code>hostname.bind</code> and <code>id.server</code>, which attackers use to fingerprint the server.</li>
<li>The views turn recursion back on for trusted clients only. Both copies of <code>example.com</code> allow transfers only with the TSIG key.</li>
</ul>
<pre tabindex="0"><code>// /etc/named.conf

acl &#34;trusted&#34; {
    localhost;
    localnets;
    192.168.0.0/16;
    10.0.0.0/8;
};

acl &#34;secondary-ns&#34; {
    192.168.1.10;
    192.168.1.11;
};

key &#34;transfer-key&#34; {
    algorithm hmac-sha256;
    secret &#34;your-secret-here&#34;;
};

options {
    directory &#34;/var/named&#34;;
    pid-file &#34;/run/named/named.pid&#34;;
    
    // Listen configuration
    listen-on port 53 { any; };
    listen-on-v6 port 53 { any; };
    
    // Security defaults
    recursion no;           // Disabled by default
    allow-query { any; };   // Allow queries
    allow-transfer { none; };  // Deny transfers by default
    allow-update { none; };    // Deny updates by default
    
    // Version hiding
    version &#34;not disclosed&#34;;
    hostname &#34;not disclosed&#34;;
    server-id &#34;not disclosed&#34;;
    
    // Response minimization
    minimal-responses yes;
    minimal-any yes;
    
    // Rate limiting
    rate-limit {
        responses-per-second 10;
        window 15;
        slip 2;
    };
    
    // DNSSEC validation
    dnssec-validation auto;
};

view &#34;internal&#34; {
    match-clients { trusted; };
    
    recursion yes;
    allow-recursion { trusted; };
    
    zone &#34;example.com&#34; {
        type primary;
        file &#34;zones/internal/example.com.zone&#34;;
        allow-transfer { key &#34;transfer-key&#34;; };
    };
    
    zone &#34;.&#34; {
        type hint;
        file &#34;named.ca&#34;;
    };
};

view &#34;external&#34; {
    match-clients { any; };
    
    recursion no;
    
    zone &#34;example.com&#34; {
        type primary;
        file &#34;zones/external/example.com.zone&#34;;
        allow-transfer { key &#34;transfer-key&#34;; };
        allow-query { any; };
    };
};

logging {
    channel default_log {
        file &#34;/var/log/named/named.log&#34; versions 5 size 10m;
        severity info;
        print-time yes;
        print-severity yes;
    };
    
    channel security_log {
        file &#34;/var/log/named/security.log&#34; versions 5 size 10m;
        severity info;
        print-time yes;
    };
    
    category default { default_log; };
    category security { security_log; };
    category xfer-in { security_log; };
    category xfer-out { security_log; };
};
</code></pre><h2 id="troubleshooting">Troubleshooting <a class="anchor" data-pagefind-ignore href="#troubleshooting" aria-label="Link to this section">#</a></h2>
<table>
	<thead>
			<tr>
					<th>Symptom</th>
					<th>Likely cause</th>
			</tr>
	</thead>
	<tbody>
			<tr>
					<td>Internal clients get external answers</td>
					<td>Client IP not in the internal view&rsquo;s <code>match-clients</code>, or the views are in the wrong order</td>
			</tr>
			<tr>
					<td><code>named-checkconf</code>: zone not in a view</td>
					<td>With views, every zone (also from <code>named.conf.local</code>) must be inside a view</td>
			</tr>
			<tr>
					<td>Internal clients get <code>REFUSED</code> for internet names</td>
					<td>Recursion off or root hint zone missing in their view</td>
			</tr>
			<tr>
					<td>Slave transfer refused</td>
					<td>Slave IP or TSIG key missing from <code>allow-transfer</code>; check the security log</td>
			</tr>
	</tbody>
</table>
<h2 id="security-checklist">Security Checklist <a class="anchor" data-pagefind-ignore href="#security-checklist" aria-label="Link to this section">#</a></h2>
<p>Before putting your BIND server into production:</p>
<ol>
<li><strong>Recursion</strong>: Disabled or restricted to trusted networks only</li>
<li><strong>Zone transfers</strong>: Restricted to secondary servers, preferably with TSIG</li>
<li><strong>Version string</strong>: Hidden to prevent fingerprinting</li>
<li><strong>Rate limiting</strong>: Enabled to prevent amplification abuse</li>
<li><strong>ACLs</strong>: Defined and applied consistently</li>
<li><strong>Views</strong>: Configured if split-horizon is needed</li>
<li><strong>Logging</strong>: Security events logged for auditing</li>
<li><strong>DNSSEC</strong>: Validation enabled for resolvers</li>
<li><strong>Updates</strong>: Disabled or restricted with TSIG keys</li>
<li><strong>Firewall</strong>: Port 53 restricted appropriately</li>
</ol>
<h2 id="automate-it">Automate it <a class="anchor" data-pagefind-ignore href="#automate-it" aria-label="Link to this section">#</a></h2>
<p>The Ansible roles and Terraform code that build this setup are on GitHub:
<a href="https://github.com/pderuiter/blog-bind-views-acls" rel="noopener">pderuiter/blog-bind-views-acls</a>. It creates an Ubuntu 24.04 VM on Proxmox and applies the complete secure configuration from this post, with the ACLs, the internal and external views, TSIG-only transfers, rate limiting and security logging; put the transfer key in an ansible-vault file, then run <code>terraform apply</code> and <code>ansible-playbook site.yml</code>.</p>
<h2 id="conclusion">Conclusion <a class="anchor" data-pagefind-ignore href="#conclusion" aria-label="Link to this section">#</a></h2>
<p>DNS security requires defense in depth. ACLs provide the foundation, views enable split-horizon deployments, and query restrictions prevent abuse. Rate limiting, minimal responses and logging complete the picture.</p>
<p>The next post will cover dynamic DNS updates with TSIG authentication, allowing secure automated record management.</p>
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